An Anecdote on Unconditional Surrender for Israel in Gaza

I recently finished reading William Craig’s The Fall of Japan, a classic Second World War history. This book covers the deployment of the 509th Composite Group, the B-29s armed with atomic bombs, which is nicely juxtaposed by the policy discussion in the 1945 White House.

In the spring, the 509th began to leave its desolate home. Eight hundred men sailed out of Seattle in May and the advance air echelon left shortly afterward.

Though the war in Europe ended on May 8, fighting in the Pacific was becoming increasingly brutal. The 509th Group now embarking for Tinian from the West Coast hopefully would bring that conflict to an abrupt end. But Harry Truman would face a grave decision because of what the 509th was training to accomplish.

On June 18, at a meeting in Washington, D.C., President Truman had talked with his military and civilian advisers:

TRUMAN: As I understand it, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after weighing all the possibilities of the situation and considering all possible alternative plans, are still of the unanimous opinion that the Kyushu operation [invasion of Japan] is the best solution under the circumstances.

ANSWER: That is correct.

TRUMAN: Mr. Stimson, what is your opinion?

STIMSON: I agree that there is no other choice.… I do think that there is a large submerged class in Japan who do not favor the present war and whose full opinion and influence have not yet been felt.… I feel something should be done to arouse them and to develop any possible influence they might have before it becomes necessary to come to grips with them.

Truman asked Admiral William Leahy for his views:

LEAHY: I do not agree with those who say that unless we obtain the unconditional surrender of the Japanese that we will have lost the war. I fear no menace from Japan in the foreseeable future, even if we are unsuccessful in forcing unconditional surrender. What I do fear is that our insistence on unconditional surrender will only result in making the Japanese more desperate and thereby increase our casualty lists. I don’t think this is at all necessary.

TRUMAN: … I don’t feel that I can take any action at this time to change public opinion on the matter.… I am quite sure that the Joint Chiefs should proceed with the Kyushu operation.

As the meeting was adjourned, Truman asked John McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, to add his comments before leaving. McCloy said that all the talk of invading Japan struck him as rather “fantastic.” The secretary asked, “Why not use the atomic bomb?”

That question eventually answered itself when the uncertainty of the new weapon’s effectiveness was resolved. Imagine what it would have taken to conquer Japan’s home islands with infantry assaults rather than strategic bombing.

This anecdote is prescient for how the Trump administration deals with Israel’s war in the Gaza Strip. Israel doesn’t have a nuclear option. They may actually have the weapons, but the proximity of the target to Israel’s own territory and the political repercussions make that unviable. So, when our President puts some boundaries on the Israeli Prime Minister’s military objectives, he’s making a similar point Admiral Leahy made in the same building eight decades ago.

Eric Shierman lives in Salem and is the author of We were winning when I was there.